Elevance Health sued the federal government on July 1, 2026 in the US District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, alleging that CMS's recalculation of 2026 Medicare Advantage star ratings cost it $115 million in quality bonus payments.

The claim is about consistency, not scoring. CMS dropped 20 disputed measures for Clover Health after losing that insurer's case, and declined to drop the same measures for five Elevance contracts that had performed well on them.

Key Takeaways

  • $115 million across five contracts is what Elevance says the narrower recalculation cost it, after CMS denied its request on June 26, 2026 and the suit followed five days later.
  • 20 measures split evenly between those CMS lacked statutory authority to collect and those added without notice-and-comment rulemaking; only the first group came out for insurers other than the plaintiff.
  • Clover's primary contract moved from 3.5 to 4.5 stars on recalculation, while other plans got a partial fix plus the removal of complaints, disenrollment and interpreter measures.
  • The 4.0-star line moves two things at once: a five-percentage-point addition to the county benchmark and a rebate share that steps from 50% to 65%, reaching 70% at 4.5.
  • $13.4 billion is the 2026 quality bonus pool, up from $12.7 billion, even as the share of MA enrollees in a bonus-qualifying plan fell to 68% from 75%.

The Inconsistency at the Center of the Suit

The dispute starts with a Georgia federal ruling in late May 2026 finding that CMS improperly included 20 measures in Clover Health's 2026 calculation, split evenly between measures built on data the agency lacked authority to collect and measures added without the rulemaking the Administrative Procedure Act requires.

CMS recalculated Clover's primary contract from 3.5 to 4.5 stars, then reran the industry the following month on a narrower basis. For everyone else it removed only the authority-based measures, not the rulemaking ones, while separately stripping member complaints, voluntary disenrollment and interpreter availability from every plan.

Elevance asked for Clover's terms, on the ground that its contracts scored well on the measures CMS kept. The agency denied that request on June 26, 2026, and the suit followed five days later. Docket 2:26-cv-00061 in the Brunswick Division names five Medicare Advantage contracts.

The complaint uses the same statutory hook that won Clover its case, arguing the denial was arbitrary and capricious. TD Cowen analyst Molly Turco described the original response as CMS appearing to concede on the data source argument while removing both challenged and unchallenged measures. The asymmetry left behind is what Elevance is suing over.

How a Star Tier Becomes $115 Million

The figure is a bid output, not a press release number, because star ratings feed the benchmark math that sets allowable revenue. A contract at 4.0 stars or above receives a quality bonus equal to a five-percentage-point addition to its county benchmark, and a contract below it receives nothing. The same line raises the share of benchmark-to-bid savings returnable as rebate dollars, from 50% below 4.0 to 65% at 4.0 and 70% at 4.5.

Both levers move at the same threshold, which is why the star tier rather than the raw score is the number that clears through a bid.

Illustrative Benchmark and Rebate Swing by Star Tier, Per 100,000 Members
Star Rating QBP Benchmark Addition Rebate Return Rate Annual Revenue Swing vs. Sub-4.0
Below 4.0 stars None 50% Baseline
4.0 stars +5.0 ppts of county benchmark 65% Roughly $36M in combined QBP and rebate lift
4.5 stars +5.0 ppts of county benchmark 70% Additional $10.8M in rebate lift over 4.0

Sources: CMS Rate Announcement (April 2026); CMS Part C bid framework. Illustrative figures assume a $1,200 county benchmark and $150 bid-to-benchmark spread across 100,000 members; actual results vary by contract geography and enrollment.

That step function is what turns a measure-level dispute into tens of millions of dollars. A plan near a boundary does not bleed value gradually as measures move against it. It loses the entire benchmark addition and the entire rebate upgrade the moment it lands on the wrong side of 4.0 or 4.5.

Elevance's book has been improving on exactly this metric: roughly 53% of its 2.2 million Medicare Advantage members are now in plans rated 4 stars or higher, against about 40% a year earlier. Against that base, a recalculation that moves a rounded score from 3.75 to 4.00, or 4.25 to 4.50, is enough to trigger both steps. That is how a narrow measure set covering complaints, disenrollment and interpreter access produces $115 million across five contracts.

A Relative Rating System Cannot Take Plaintiff-Specific Inputs

Most star measures are not scored against an absolute standard. CMS applies a clustering algorithm that assigns tiers from the distribution of scores across the national MA market for that measure and year, so removing a measure for some plans and not others changes more than the affected plans' numerators. It changes the population setting every remaining measure's cut points, because the clustering runs on whichever plans and measures are actually in the calculation.

That is the structural version of the inconsistency claim. A cut-point system assumes every competitor is scored against the same measure set and the same comparison population. Once removals vary by who litigated, a plan's tier is partly a function of which competitor sued first and which measures a judge struck for them. The three measures CMS stripped for everyone did not generate a suit precisely because they applied evenly; the ten removed for Clover alone did.

The pattern is now three plan years deep. Suits from SCAN Health Plan, Zing Health and Elevance itself forced a recalculation of 2024 ratings that added roughly $1 billion of quality bonus payments industry-wide, a second wave followed for 2025, and Clover makes three. For a bid actuary that changes what a published rating is: the measure set itself is no longer fixed, so a forecast of clinical performance against a stable definition is only half the variance.

The pool being contested is concentrating at the same time. CMS will spend at least $13.4 billion on the program in 2026, up from $12.7 billion and more than four times the $3.0 billion it cost in 2015, while the share of enrollees in a bonus-qualifying plan has fallen to 68% from 75%, the lowest since 2018.

Total bonus spending is 2.3% of the $574 billion CMS projects paying MA plans overall, and it is the whole margin difference between clearing 4.0 stars and not. With Clover, CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield and Elevance all in court in 2026, the expected value of a challenge for any plan near a threshold is difficult to set at zero.

Further Reading

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